IMT Nuremberg Archives

H – 2318

International Court of Justice

H2318 – 0001

H2318 - 0002

OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

EVIDENCE DIVISION

Date: 16. July 1948

I certify that Document Number 1760-PS was introduced into evidence as Exhibit Number USA-54 in the Trial by the International Tribunal of Hermann GOERING, et al., which commenced on 20 November 1945, and that the attached photostat is a true and correct copy of the original.

Fred Niebergall

FRED NIEBERGALL
Chief, Document Control Branch

DCB-36 (102447)

H2318 - 0003

C E R T I F I C A T E

I hereby certify that the annexed document 1760-PS No. USA-57 is a photostat of an original document submitted in evidence by the United States Prosecution under this number. The original document has been withdrawn in accordance with Rule 10 of the International Military Tribunal, and to the best of my knowledge and belief is to be held at the National Archives, Washington D.C.

Nuremberg, 23 June 1948

Paul Joosten

PAUL A. JOOSTEN

General Secretary
International Military
Tribunal

Archivo

H2318 - 0004

Extract of Document No. 1760-PS

Dr. Seyss-Inquart himself was a prominent Vienna lawyer, who had long been an intimate personal friend of Chancellor Schuschnigg. The Chancellor himself told me on various occasions that Dr. Seyss-Inquart had frequently attempted to convince him that the admission of the Nazis into the Austrian Cabinet would be for the best interest of Austria, in that it would relieve the pressure on Austria by Germany, and that he (Seyss-Inquart) at all times professed a sincere desire to maintain the independence of Austria. I had little personal contact with Seyss-Inquart but I knew from various sources absolutely reliable that while Seyss-Inquart was making these protestations to the Chancellor with whom he had had this intimate friendship, and which the Chancellor repaid by his confidence, Seyss-Inquart was in fact completely insincere. He was known at the time, and I had knowledge of this, to be in frequent contact with many high officials of the German Government and that he had had contact with Hitler himself. My information on this point was obtained not only from sources in Austria but also from acquaintances in Germany. There is only one thing which can be said in favor of Seyss-Inquart at the time and that is that he perhaps did believe the German protestations made to him that Austria's independence would be respected. It is difficult, however, to conceive that a man who was known to have the legal ability and intelligence of Seyss-Inquart could have been completely taken in by these protestations. The probabilities are that at least from the outset he used his friendship with Chancellor Schuschnigg in order to help to destroy the independence of his country in order to make a place for himself.

H2318 - 0005

USA 539

Extract of Document No. 1760-PS

Dr. Seyss-Inquart himself was a prominent Vienna Lawyer, who had long been an intimate personal friend of Chancellor Schuschnigg. The Chancellor himself told me on various occasions that Dr. Seyss-Inquart had frequently attempted to convince him that the admission of the Nazis into the Austrian Cabinet would be for the best interest of Austria, in that it would relieve the pressure on Austria by Germany, and that he (Seyss-Inquart) at all times professed a sincere desire to maintain the independence of Austria. I had little personal contact with Seyss-Inquart but I knew from various sources absolutely reliable that while Seyss-Inquart was making these protestations to the Chancellor with whom he had had this intimate friendship, and which the Chancellor repaid by his confidence, Seyss-Inquart was in fact completely insincere. He was known at the time, and I had knowledge of this, to be in frequent contact with many high officials of the German Government and that he had had contact with Hitler himself. My information on this point was obtained not only from sources in Austria but also from acquaintances in Germany. There is only one thing which can be said in favor of Seyss-Inquart at the time and that is that he perhaps did believe the German protestations made to him that Austria's independence would be respected. It is difficult, however, to conceive that a man who was known to have the legal ability and intelligence of Seyss-Inquart could have been completely taken in by these protestations. The probabilities are that at least from the outset he had used his friendship with Chancellor Schuschnigg in order to help to destroy the independence of his country in order to make a place for himself.

H2318 -0006

Extract of Document No. 1760-PS

Dr. Seyss-Inquart himself was a prominent Vienna Lawyer, who had long been an intimate personal friend of Chancellor Schuschnigg. The Chancellor himself told me on various occasions that Dr. Seyss-Inquart had frequently attempted to convince him that the admission of the Nazis into the Austrian Cabinet would be for the best interest of Austria, in that it would relieve the pressure on Austria by Germany, and that he (Seyss-Inquart) at all times professed a sincere desire to maintain the independence of Austria. I had little personal contact with Seyss-Inquart but I knew from various sources absolutely reliable that while Seyss-Inquart was making these protestations to the Chancellor with whom he had had this intimate friendship, and which the Chancellor repaid by his confidence, Seyss-Inquart was in fact completely insincere. He was known at the time, and I had knowledge of this, to be in frequent contact with many high officials of the German Government and that he had had contact with Hitler himself. My information on this point was obtained not only from sources in Austria but also from acquaintances in Germany. There is only one thing which can be said in favor of Seyss-Inquart at the time and that is that he perhaps did believe the German protestations made to him that Austria's independence would be respected. It is difficult, however, to conceive that a man who was known to have the legal ability and intelligence of Seyss-Inquart could have been completely taken in by these protestations. The probabilities are that at least from the outset he used ... friendship with Chancellor Schuschnigg in order to help to destroy the independence of his country in order to make a place for himself.

H2318 -0007

Extract of Document No. 1760-PS

Dr. Seyss-Inquart himself was a prominent Vienna Lawyer, who had long been an intimate personal friend of Chancellor Schuschnigg. The Chancellor himself told me on various occasions that Dr. Seyss-Inquart had frequently attempted to convince him that the admission of the Nazis into the Austrian Cabinet would be for the best interest of Austria, in that it would relieve the pressure on Austria by Germany, and that he (Seyss-Inquart) at all times professed a sincere desire to maintain the independence of Austria. I had little personal contact with Seyss-Inquart but I knew from various sources absolutely reliable that while Seyss-Inquart was making these protestations to the Chancellor with whom he had had this intimate friendship, and which the Chancellor repaid by his confidence, Seyss-Inquart was in fact completely insincere. He was known at the time, and I had knowledge of this, to be in frequent contact with many high officials of the German Government and that he had had contact with Hitler himself. My information on this point was obtained not only from sources in Austria but also from acquaintances in Germany. There is only one thing which can be said in favor of Seyss-Inquart at the time and that is that he perhaps did believe the German protestations made to him that Austria's independence would be respected. It is difficult, however, to conceive that a man who was known to have the legal ability and intelligence of Seyss-Inquart could have been completely taken in by these protestations. The probabilities are that at least from the outset he had used his friendship with Chancellor Schuschnigg in order to help to destroy the independence of his country in order to make a place for himself.

H2318 – 0008

Extract of Document No. 1760-PS

Dr. Seyss-Inquart himself was a prominent Vienna Lawyer, who had long been an intimate personal friend of Chancellor Schuschnigg. The Chancellor himself told me on various occasions that Dr. Seyss-Inquart had frequently attempted to convince him that the admission of the Nazis into the Austrian Cabinet would be for the best interest of Austria, in that it would relieve the pressure on Austria by Germany, and that he (Seyss-Inquart) at all times professed a sincere desire to maintain the independence of Austria. I had little personal contact with Seyss-Inquart but I knew from various sources absolutely reliable that while Seyss-Inquart was making these protestations to the Chancellor with whom he had had this intimate friendship, and which the Chancellor repaid by his confidence, Seyss-Inquart was in fact completely insincere. He was known at the time, and I had knowledge of this, to be in frequent contact with many high officials of the German Government and that he had had contact with Hitler himself. My information on this point was obtained not only from sources in Austria but also from acquaintances in Germany. There is only one thing which can be said in favor of Seyss-Inquart at the time and that is that he perhaps did believe the German protestations made to him that Austria's independence would be respected. It is difficult, however, to conceive that a man who was known to have the legal ability and intelligence of Seyss-Inquart could have been completely taken in by these protestations. The probabilities are that at least from the outset he used his friendship with Chancellor Schuschnigg in order to help to destroy the independence of his country in order to make a place for himself.

H2318-0008A

1760-PS

1760-PS

1760-PS

MEXICO CITY, D. F.)
) SS.
MEXICO)
)

United Mexican States
Mexico, Federal District } SS
Embassy of the United
States of America

GEORGE S. MESSERSMITH, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

During the period 1930 to the late spring of 1934, I was Consul General of the United States of America in Berlin. During that period and particularly during the years 1933 and until my departure for Austria in the late spring of 1934, the nature of my work brought me into frequent contact with German Government officials. As background for this statement it is pertinent to state that this contact with German Government officials in the highest categories was necessary by me as Consul General, and some of my principal associates, because of the circumstances of the period.

In the period immediately preceding the coming into power of the National Socialists it was necessary for me and some of my principal associates in the Consulate General to have contact with high officials of the German Government because of the unsettled state of affairs in Germany due to the uncertain political situation; this involved difficulties for American firms of various kinds which made the intervention of the Consulate General in the line of its regular duty necessary. In addition to this contact with the officials of the Government, as a matter of further duty, I had contact with individuals in all parties in Germany in order to keep myself and therefore our Government currently informed with regard to developments in the political picture in Germany. During that period,

and

A 035778

H2318 - 0009

H2318 -0010

1760-PS

before the National Socialists came into power, I therefore had contact of an informal character with persons in the National Socialist Party for the purpose of securing information as to their aims and objectives, but that contact was, before the access to power of that party, with secondary rather than with the first ranking members thereof.

Immediately after the access to power of the National Socialist Government in the beginning of 1933, all sorts of steps of an arbitrary character were taken by the new Government and by its various agencies and dependencies which affected the rights of American citizens and property and in the carrying through of my official duty as Consul General I had the primary responsibility for the protection of American citizens and property. In consequences of this responsibility I had to see frequently almost all of the high ranking members of the German Government with the exception of Hitler and a very large number of officials below the rank of Minister. The nature of my duties was such that a considerable portion of my days had to be spent in visits on such officials to discuss the protection of American interests and property. Some of these secondary officials I had known before the Party came to power, for information purposes.

It is difficult to explain adequately in a statement of this kind the circumstances under which these officials of the Nazi German Government frequently took occasion to talk to me most frankly about matters of general Nazi policy and to discuss frankly and freely the aims and purposes of the Nazi regime. Frequently our

A 085780

conversations

1760-PS

conversations were long and difficult because of the matters which I had to present and on which I had to take the firmest stand. Not infrequently at the end of such official conversations they spoke freely and without any reserve with regard to the aims of the regime.

It is the more important to bring this out in this preliminary section of my statement because I did not at any time conceal from any of these Nazi officials my complete lack of sympathy with the course which they were pursuing nor did I hesitate to say to them what I considered was the danger of the course which they were pursuing not only for Germany but for Europe and the rest of the world. Their freedom of expression to me was all the more interesting in view of the fact that I never hesitated to assert in the strongest possible way the rights of the United States and of its citizens when they were violated. It requires a knowledge of the circumstances of the time, of the character and psychology of these high Nazi and secondary Nazi officials to be able to appreciate that the fact that I was forthright in my views and did not hesitate to express them and particularly that we stood out so strongly for the rights of our country and our citizens that led them to respect me and my associates and to reveal to me more than they very probably revealed to other foreign representatives. Whatever the reasons may have been, however, the Nazi Government officials, almost without exception from the highest to the lowest with whom I had contact, were on most occasions amazingly frank in their conversation and without any concealment of their aims.

Among

A 035781

H2318 -0011

H2318 - 0012

1760-PS

Among the men whom I saw frequently, and upon the conversations with which I rely for many of the statements mentioned hereinafter were the following.

1. Hermann Goering. Goering immediately on the access to power of the Nazis became Minister of the Interior of Prussia and as such controlled the police and in many respects the internal matters of the rest of Germany. He was the head of the Gestapo, of the police and of the administrative machinery of Prussia. Shortly thereafter he became Air Minister and in a number of conversations made it perfectly clear that Germany was going to build up the strongest Air Force in the world through which it would have one of the strongest instruments in order to carry through its avowed policies. I found Goering one of the few men in the Nazi regime and in some respects the only one with whom a reasonable conversation could be conducted and who was open to a certain amount of conviction on certain points at least. He was a strong personality and full of hates and prejudices and with a determination, as he frequently expressed it, to wipe out the disgrace of the First World War.

2. General Milch. General Milch was not a Nazi before the Party came into power in 1933. He had been head of the Deutsche Luft Hansa, the principal German air company which had lines all over Germany and to various parts of Europe and even the Far East. He was an extraordinarily capable man and Goering brought him in as his principal assistant in the Air Ministry and raised him to the rank of General in order to carry through his determination to build up the German Air Force as rapidly as possible.

4085782

H2318 – 0013

1760-PS

3. Hjalmar Schacht. Schacht was without question one of the most resourceful financiers not only in Germany but in Europe at the time. Born in the United States, he spoke English perfectly. He professed great friendship and understanding of the United States. He was one of those who was responsible in the latter months of 1932, together with other financiers and with certain industrialists in paying off the debts of the Nazi Party and in bringing it into power. Schacht was an extremely ambitious man and believed that he would be President of Germany under the Nazis. He and his associates believed that by bringing the Nazis into power they would be able to control the regime after it came in and mold Germany to their own ends, which were in many respects not the ends of the Nazi regime. There is no doubt that it was through the financial genius and resourcefulness of Schacht that it was possible for the Nazi regime to maintain itself during the first years it was in power for without the financial operations of Schacht the rearmament program and other programs of the Nazis leading to economic and political domination of Europe would not have been possible.

4. Hans Frank. He was one of the most fanatic and pronounced and outspoken of the Nazis and one of the most radical from the outset. I make this statement on the basis of conversations with him.

5. Wilhelm Frick. He was one of the most pronounced and fanatic of the Nazis like Frank who made no concealment of the real aims of the Nazi regime from the very outset.

6. Count Schwerin von Krosigk. He was one of the men who was not Nazi before the advent of the Nazi Party to power but permitted

A 085783

himself

H2318 -0014

1760-PS

himself to be associated with the regime for opportunistic reasons. It is likely that at the outset he did not share any of the Nazi economic or political objectives, but whether he did or not he became, because of his personal efficiency, one of their effective instruments.

7. Joseph Goebbels. Next to Hitler, Goebbels was the most fanatic, ruthless, and cynical of all the Nazi leaders, and his intelligence and resourcefulness were unquestionable. Goering and Goebbels together were the two principal lieutenants of Hitler in the beginnings of the regime and remained so. Of all of the Nazi leaders next to Hitler, none was more dangerous than Goebbels. He had a twisted mind and there was nothing which restrained him in any action in any field. I know this from conversations with him.

8. Richard Walther Darré. Darré was a man of second-rate mental capacity but a fanatic who was one of the principal leaders in the inner councils of the Nazi Party. While he did not originate policy, he was one of those because of his ruthlessness who was one of the perfect instruments to carry through policy.

9. Robert Ley. Ley was a fanatic of considerable intelligence whose principal task it was to operate in the field of labor. He was utterly ruthless as his acts, which are an historical record, show.

10. Hans Heinrich Lammers. He was one of the functionaries of previous German Governments who for opportunistic reasons became one of the effective instruments of the Nazi regime. He had a very thorough knowledge of the German bureaucratic machinery and was of tremendous help in the Nazi regime from the outset through lending it his intelligence and his knowledge.

A 005784

H2318 - 0015

1760-PS

11. Otto Meissner. Meissner was, like Lammers, a former functionary whose continuous record was that of an intriguer and opportunist. Sly, clever and in a measure intelligent, he was one of the earlier instruments used by the Nazis to carry through their aims and he was used by them because of his close association with former President von Hindenburg and the absolute confidence which Hindenburg had in him. Meissner was a sinister person who is one of the ones responsible for the Nazi Party coming into power and for furthering its aims when it was in.

12. Franz von Papen. Any statement with regard to von Papen would have to be incomplete. It is sufficient to say that his actuation was entirely opportunistic. He was not a Nazi when the Nazis came in. He remained in opposition to the Nazis for some period after they came in. He had been marked for liquidation in the June 1934 St. Bartholomew's Day purge. In spite of all this he became one of the most effective Nazi instruments, particularly in the diplomatic field, and was used in order to undermine the sovereignty and independence of other states. Von Papen was without conscience, and while he perhaps never sympathized with certain things which the Nazis did, he nevertheless worked for them and their objectives with the same zeal as any of the higher officials of the Party, including Hitler himself.

13. Walther Funk. He had been the editor of one of the leading financial journals in Berlin before the Nazis came in and had very little declared Nazis sympathy when they did come in. He was immediately drawn into the new Nazi organization by Goebbels and later he became

A 085785

an

H2318 - 0016

ardent Nazi and one of their most effective instruments because of his undoubted capacities in various fields.

14. General Wilhelm Keitel. He was, when the Nazis came in, one of the leading Generals in the German Army who had no sympathies with the Nazi regime but who believed that it could be used in order to give the German Army new power and thus give Germany a new position in Europe, to which he believed she was entitled.

From what Keitel told me, I believe that at the beginning of the Nazi regime he had no sympathy for the Nazi objectives against the sovereignty of other European states. At that time he was interested only in using the Nazi regime to get power for the German Army and reestablish the position of Germany in Europe. When it began to appear that the Nazi objective was within reach,, and that Germany could dominate Europe, he became a willing partner of the Nazis in all of their aims.

15. Admiral Eric von Raeder. Admiral von Raeder was one of the most important officers of the German Navy when the Nazis came in. The remarks above made with respect to General Keitel apply to Raeder. He was interested primarily in building up the German Navy and using the Nazis for that purpose. Like Keitel, he did not become imbued with the Nazi ideas of domination until long afterwards when they became drunk with the idea of complete domination which seemed within reach..

16. Admiral Karl Doenitz. Admiral Doenitz was always not well mentally balanced. He was not a Nazi when the Party came into power. He became, however, one of the earliest high officers of the Army and Navy to completely identify himself with the Nazi ideology and aims.

4085786

H2318 -0017

1760-B5

1760-B5

17. Dr. Bohle. He was a very intelligent and resourceful man, a fanatic Nazi who was used to direct the activities of the Nazis in various countries, particularly of a propaganda character. He was a complete Nazi.

18. Dr. Stuckert was a former functionary who was inclined towards the Nazi ideology when the Nazis came in and who became immediately on their access to power one of their leading instruments. As the Under Secretary of Education it was he who carried through the radical measures for the complete control of the church and schools and universities in the country.

19. Dr. Krupp von Bohlen. Not a Nazi and perhaps never completely identified with the Nazi ideology, he became one of their perfect instruments in carrying through the rearmament program in Germany. He did this because he thought it would make Germany dominant in the economic field. My conversations with Bohlen and my knowledge of him after I left Germany led me to believe that he was never in reality in sympathy with the greater part of the Nazi aspirations and certainly not with the social ideology.

20. Dr. Davidson. He was a former official of the Foreign Office and remained there after the Nazis came in. He was never in so far as I could tell in any way sympathetic with the political or social or economic objectives of the Nazis. He remained in the Foreign Office merely to eat and he was one of the best sources of information which I had.

In the late spring or early summer of 1934, I cannot recall the exact date, I left my post as Consul General at Berlin to go to Vienna

A 035787

H2318 - 0018

1760-PS

Vienna where I remained until the late spring of 1937. During my stay in Austria, I had intimate official and personal contact with the highest officials of the Austrian Government as well as with many of the secondary and lower ranking officials. I had this intimate contact with these officials of the Austrian Government from the very outset due undoubtedly to the fact that when I came to Austria it was already well known that I was an outspoken opponent of all that the Nazi Government and leaders stood for. In consequence, even though I was the Minister of a country which was considered in Austria as having no immediate concern in Austria's foreign relations, I received much information from the many Austrian officials on developments in Austro-German relations and in their relations with other countries in Europe. Among those whom I saw frequently and from whom I obtained information were the following:

President Miklas
Chancellor Dollfuss
Chancellor Schuschnigg
Foreign Minister Berger-Waldenegg
Police President and Minister of
Security, Hofrat Skubl.

In addition, I should add that there were both in Berlin and in Vienna a corps of correspondents, many of whom were of outstanding ability and with whom I was in frequent contact.

Finally, I should say that during my stay in Austria I made fairly frequent trips to Berlin and on many of these saw and talked with the same persons whom I had known during my residence there as Counsul-General. Thus I maintained my German sources of information as well as acquiring new Austrian ones.

4 085788

I feel

H2318 - 0019

1760-PS
1760-PS

I feel fully qualified, therefore, to speak with authority on the matters which follow in this statement. The specific conversations and events which I recite are, of course, specific facts which I set forth here as facts. As to many of them, I have refreshed my recollection as to details from contemporaneous reports and letters which I wrote during this period. The opinions which I offer are, I believe, fully warranted by the sum total of information which I received from all sources

From the very beginnings of the Nazi Government, I was told by both high and secondary Government officials in Germany that incorporation of Austria into Germany was a political and economic necessity and that this incorporation was going to be accomplished "by whatever means were necessary". Although I cannot assign definite times and places, I am sure that at various times and places every one of the German officials whom I have listed earlier in this statement told me this, with the exception of Schacht, von Krosigk and Krupp von Bohlen. I can assert that it was fully understood by everyone in Germany who had any knowledge whatever of what was going on that Hitler and the Nazi Government were irrevocably committed to this end and the only doubt which ever existed in conversations or statements to me was "how" and "when".

At the beginnings of the Nazi regime in 1933, Germany was, of course, far too weak to permit any open threats of force against any country, such as the threats which the Nazis made in 1938. Instead it was the avowed and declared policy of the Nazi Government to accomplish the same results which they later accomplished

A 085789 through

1760-PS

1760-PS

through force through the methods which had proved so successful for them in Germany - obtain a foothold in the Cabinet, particularly in the Ministry of the Interior which controlled the police, and then quickly eliminate the opposition elements. During my stay in Austria I was told on any number of occasions by Chancellor Dollfuss, Chancellor Schuschnigg, President Miklas and other high officials of the Austrian Government that the German Government kept up constant and unceasing pressure upon the Austrian Government to agree to the inclusion of a number of Ministers with Nazi orientation. The English and French Ministers in Vienna with whom I was in constant and close contact confirmed this information through statements which they made to me of conversations which they had with high Austrian officials.

In order to compel the Austrian Government to accept their terms the Nazis resorted to almost every conceivable measure, including economic pressure, propaganda, and most important of all, terroristic acts. My information concerning these terroristic outrages came partly from official communiques of the Austrian Government, partly from responsible news sources, and to a very considerable extent from Skubl, the Police President and later Minister of Public Security, whom I saw frequently and knew well. The Austrian secret police under the direction of Skubl, it should be noted, was one of the most efficient in all of Europe.

The outrages were an almost constant occurrence, but there were three distinct periods during which they rose to a peak.

During

A 085790

H2318 - 0020

H2318 - 0021

1760-PS

During the first two of these periods -- in mid-1933, and in early 1934--I was still in Berlin. However, during that period I was told by high Nazi officials in conversation with them that these waves of terror were being instigated and directed by them. I found no concealment in my conversations with high Nazi officials of the fact that they were responsible for these activities in Austria. These admissions were entirely consistent with the Nazi thesis that terror is necessary and must be used to impose the will of the Party not only in Germany but in other countries. I recall specifically that General Milch was one of those who spoke frankly that these outrages in Austria were being directed by the Nazi Party and expressed his concern with respect thereto and his disagreement with this definite policy of the Party.

During the wave of terroristic acts in May and June 1934, I had already assumed my duties as American Minister in Vienna. The bomb outrages during this period were directed primarily at railways, tourist centers, and the Catholic Church, which latter, in the eyes of the Nazis, was one of the strongest organizations opposing them. I recall, however, that these outrages diminished markedly for a few days during the meeting of Hitler and Mussolini in Venice in mid-June 1934. At that time Mussolini was strongly supporting the Austrian Government and was strongly and deeply interested in maintaining Austrian independence and sovereignty and in keeping down Nazi influence and activity in Austria. At that time also Hitler could not afford an open break with Mussolini and undoubtedly agreed to the short cessation of these bomb outrages on the insistence of

Mussolini

A 085791

H2318 - 0022

Mussolini because he, Hitler, wished to achieve as favorable an atmosphere for the meeting between him and Mussolini as possible. The cessation of the bomb outrages during the Hitler-Mussolini conversations was considered by me and by the Austrian authorities and by all observers at that time as an open admission on the part of Hitler and the German Government that the outrages were systematically and completely instigated and controlled from Germany.

While I cannot recall at this time the details of the terroristic acts, they were fully reported in the Legation despatches of the period. These reports were based upon intimate and frequent contact with high Austrian officials and many of the details I received from the then head of the Austrian Police, Dr. Skubl. While there was no doubt whatever that these outrages had been conducted and directed by Germany, there was ample evidence as to the origin of the outrages from the fact that fragments of the bombs collected by the Austrian police showed that they were of German manufacture and had been introduced from Germany into Austria. While I do not recall having seen any of these bomb fragments myself, I recall specifically having been told by high Austrian authorities that they had seen them and that there was no doubt as to the origin of the bombs. A further proof that these outrages were directed from Germany, although in most cases the bombs were actually planted by Austrian Nazis, is found in the fact that the records of the Vienna Police and Courts at the time will show that when some of these Nazis were arrested they declared proudly that they had committed these acts.

4 085792 At various

1960-PS

1960-PS

At various times I or A. W. Kliefoth, Counselor of the Legation, reported on these outrages because of their significance. Quotations from some of these despatches are as follows:

> "Trunks containing inflamable material were placed in the three leading railway stations of Vienna and timed to explode simultaneously on the evening of May 6. The damage was very slight. The police charged the Nazis with the Crime.
>
> "Ah official communique, dated May 10, announced that on the previous evening a bomb was exploded near the Philadelphia Bridge in Vienna, wounding two persons. The same evening a bomb was exploded in one of the local beer gardens, at which a picnic of the Heimwehr was being held, slightly wounding a woman"
>
> Official despatch from Vienna dated May 15, 1934.
>
> "During the past week the continuation of the Nazi terrorist activities in bombing public places and railway lines, with the object of damaging the Austrian tourist trade, some of which are described below, was the source of serious concern to the authorities. This terrorism was carried out according to a well organized plan, undoubtedly conducted by Nazi agents in Germany. The explosives used by the Nazis during the past week, according to the Foreign Office, were all manufactured in Germany and smuggled into Austria."
>
> "In a communique dated May 24, the authorities also admitted a number of other bomb outrages at Braunau, Bad Ischl and Dorf an der Pram. While the damage to both life and property was small - no lives were lost- the Government admitted its inability to cope with the situation with the existing measures of security. . . .
>
> "The authorities further confirmed officially, on May 25, a bomb explosion on May 23 in the residence of the Archbishop of Salzburg, which caused considerable damage. At Morsg, near Salzburg, on May 23, a bomb explosion wrecked a flower-kiosk, causing damages amounting to 10,000 schillings. A nine year old child was severely injured in Anleiten, near Ried."
>
> Official Despatch from Vienna dated May 29, 1934.

"The Nazi

4 085793

H2318 -0023

H2318 – 0024

1760-PS

1760-PS

"The Nazi terrorist outrages continued during the past week in spite of the Government's notification regarding the application throughout Austria of martial law for crimes of public violence. These crimes, now punishable by death, included malicious acts against public order, and damage to the railway, telegraph, telephone and wireless services of the State.

"The new development in the recent outrages was that many of the acts were directed against the property of the Roman Catholic Church, which in the eyes of the Nazis was the strongest organization opposing the Nazi regime.

"In addition to the attempted bombing of the Archbishop's palace in Salzburg, a few days previously, a bomb was exploded on May 20 in an annex to the Archbishop's palace in Feldkirch, which caused minor dmmages. The police charged Nazis with the outrages and arrested a number of suspects. During the night of May 27, a bomb explosion broke windows in the churches and vicarage of St. Paul in Carinthia.

"In Linz, on May 26, a bomb exploded before the entrance of one of the schools, breaking 44 windows. The school was empty at the time the outrage was committed. During the same night, an attempt was made to blow up the electric works at Brannau, causing a temporary suspension of the electric service.

"Other outrages, not reported by the press, included an attempt to blow up one of the bridges over the Danube in Vienna on May 30, a bomb explosion in one of the popular cafes, and numerous bombings of telephone and newspaper kioska."

Official Dewpatch from Vienna dated June 4, 1934.

"The National Socialist terrorism in Austria, which started slowly and cautiously several weeks ago, culminated in a heavy and rather serious outbreak on June 8 to June 11, threatening not only the peace and security of the country, but the foreign tourist trade, an exceedingly important item in Austria's economic life. The attempts to wreck the railway lines near Vienna and in other parts of Austria, as well as terrorist outrages in the principal tourist centers, occupied the attention of the Government above all other matters. After a number of important cabinet sessions, new measures were adopted to counteract the terrorism, and the matter was also the subject of diplomatic conversations between Austria and Germany."

A085794

Official Despatch from Vienna dated June 13, 1934.

The outrages

H2318 - 0025

"The outrages in Austria during the week ending June 23, while almost as numerous as in the week preceding, were less violent in character. The attacks were directed, as heretofore, against the quarters of anti-Nazi associations and persons, public utilities, but less against the railway communications. Additional stores of explosives materials were uncovered in Vienna and elsewhere."

. . . . .

"A recent terrorist explosion in the Vienna School of Agronomy caused damages amounting to about 40,000 schillings. As a result of the Nazi outrages, the school has been closed for one week.

In an attempted bomb attack on the post office in Bregenz, the capital of the Province of Vorarlberg, the police seized a supply of explosives bearing labels of "Sprengstoffwerke Kloster Lechfeld, G.m.b.H.", "Dynamit A.G. Hamburg, Alfred Nobel & Co.", and "Fabrik Wurzendorf", explosive factories domiciled in Germany.

Official Despatch from Vienna dated June 25, 1934.

"During the week ending June 30 there were less terrorist outrages of major importance, but the number of small outrages, bomb explosions, attacks on electric, water, and railway establishments had not decreased. The principal attacks were directed against Catholic institutions, ex-National Socialists, and the city of Salzburg. The purpose in the latter case was to frighten foreign tourists away from the Summer Music Festivals at Salzburg.

"A bomb which exploded in the Roman Catholic vicargge in Kapfenberg, in the Province of Styria, on June 24, resulted in the death of the Chaplain, Reverend Franz Eibel. Several other persons were slightly injured. The death was one of terrorism, although there were several cases of attacks. Likewise there were attacks on other Church institutions in different parts of the country.

"A series of outrages were reported on June 28 from Salzburg and adjoining tourist centers. Bombs were exploded in the market place and elsewhere, and attempts were made to blow up the electric and railway communications. The outrages were particularly directed at Salzburg at this time in view of the forthcoming Summer Festivals, which ordinarily attract thousands of non-German tourists. Similar attacks were made the same day in the Provinces of Vorarlberg and Tyrol."

Official Despatch from Vienna dated July 3, 1934.

4085795

A series

1760-PS

"A series of lesser outrages were reported from all parts of Austria on Sunday, July 15. A large amount of explosives were stolen from a shop in Gloggnitz; the director of the institution was fined 600 schillings and sentenced to two weeks imprisonment for negligence in guarding the supplies. In Unterkirchen, on July 17, a bomb explosion damaged the local vicarge and the electric works. On July 18 a bomb explosion in Innsbruck injured one person, whereas in St. Kathrein a house was damaged. In Vienna on July 18 a public telephone was damaged, and set on fire. The perpetrator, a National Socialist, was immediately apprehended by the Police. At Edlach, a summer resort about 100 kilometers from Vienna, an attempt was made to bomb the railway. A similar attempt was made in a Tyrolian mountain railway station."

Official Despatch from Vienna dated July 26, 1934.

In addition to these outrages, the Nazis attempted to bring pressure upon Austria by means of the "Austrian Legion". This organization, a para-military force of several thousand men, was stationed near the Austrian border in Germany as a constant and direct threat of violent action against Austria. It was without any question sanctioned by the Nazi Government of Germany as it could otherwise not have existed, and it was armed by them. It was made up of Austrian Nazis who had fled from Austria after committing various crimes in Austria and by Austrians in Germany who were attracted by the idle life and pay given by the German authorities.

After

A 085796

H2318 -0026

H2318 -0027

After the July Putsch, in August 1934, in Vienna I was told by the British Military Attaché in Vienna of a conversation which he had had with the German Military Attaché in Vienna, General Muff. It may be observed here that to my knowledge General Muff was a rather influential person in Germany and one who played a preponderant role in the German Legation in Vienna. General Muff told the British Military Attaché that he had just been in Germany and had spent three days with Hitler at Berchtesgaden, during which time he had had several conversations with Hitler. He said then - in August 1934 - that the Austrian Legion had not yet been dissolved and that Hitler had talked at length with him about the Legion. General Muff did not deem it worth while to conceal to the British Military Attaché the fact that the Austrian Legion had been armed and that the Nazis had armed it. I saw General Muff later myself and received the same impression as to these facts although he was not as frank and direct in his statements with me as he had been with the British Military Attaché.

The events of the Putsch of July 25, 1934, are too well known for me to repeat them in this statement. I need say here only that there can be no doubt that the Putsch was ordered and organized by the Nazi officials from Germany through their organization in Austria made up of German Nazis and Austrian Nazis. Dr. Rieth, the German Minister in Vienna, was fully familiar with all that was going to happen and that was being planned. The German Legation was located directly across the street from the British Legation and the Austrian secret police kept close watch on the persons who entered the German Legation. The British had their own secret

A 035797

service

1760-PS

service in Vienna at the time and they also kept a discreet surviellance over people entering the German Legation. I was told by both British and Austrian officials that a number of the men who were later found guilty by the Austrian Courts of having been implicated in the Putsch had frequented the German Legation. In addition, I personally followed very closely the activities of Dr. Rieth and I never doubted on the basis of all my information that Dr. Rieth was in close touch and constant touch with the Nazi agents in Austria; these agents being both German and Austrian. Dr. Rieth could not have been unfamiliar with the Putsch and the details in connection therewith. I recall too very definitely from my conversations with the highest officials of the Austrian Government after the Putsch, their informing me that Dr. Rieth had been in touch with von Rintelen, who it had been planned by the Nazis was to succeed Chancellor Dollfuss had the Putsch been successful.

It may be that Dr. Rieth was himself not personally sympathetic with the plans for the Putsch but there is no question that he was fully familiar with all these plans and must have given his assent thereto and connived therein.

As this Putsch was so important and was a definite attempt to overthrow the Austrian Government and resulted in the murder of the Chancellor of Austria., I took occasion to verify at the time for myself various other items of evidence indicating that the Putsch was not only made with the knowledge of the German

Government

A 085798

H2318 - 0029

1760-PS

Government but engineered by it. I found and verified that almost a month before the Putsch, Goebbels told Signor Cerruti, the Italian Ambassador in Berlin, that there would be a Nazi Government in Vienna in a month. On the evening before the Putsch, A pamphlet appeared in the streets of Berlin from which it appeared that the Nazi Government had full knowledge of what was planned the next day in Vienna. An attempt was made by the German authorities in Berlin to suppress this pamphlet and this effort was partly successful but copies of it were available at the time and I recall an officer of our Embassy in Berlin, whose name I cannot specifically recall at this time, informing me that he had seen a copy thereof. Articles also appeared in some of the German papers of July 25, indicating that they had information as to the time that the Putsch was to take place. I will not go into detail as to the character of the evidence but there is no question from the historical record and the facts as known to me from direct knowledge at the time that the Putsch was engineered and directed by the German Government from Berlin and Munich.

For two years following the failure of the July 25 Putsch, the Nazis remained relatively quiet in Austria. Very few terroristic acts occurred during the remainder of 1934 and as I recall in 1935 and most of 1936; this inactivity was in accordance with directives from Berlin as direct evidence to that effect, which came to my knowledge at that time, proved. Early in January, the Austrian Foreign Minister, Berger-Waldenegg, furnished me a document which I considered accurate in all respects and which stated:

4085799

"The German Minister here, von Papen, on the occasion of his last visit to Berlin, was received three times

by

H2318 - 0030

1760-PS

by Chancellor Hitler for fairly long conversations, and he also took this opportunity to call on Schacht and von Neurath. In these conversations the following instructions were given to him:

"During the next two years nothing can be undertaken which will give Germany external political diffidulties. On this ground, everything must be avoided which could awaken the appearance of Germany interfering in the internal affairs of Austria. Chancellor Hitler will, therefore, also for this reason not endeavor to intervene in the present prevailing difficult crisis in the National Socialist Party in Austria, although he is convinced that order could be brought into the Party at once through a word from him. This word, however, he will, for foreign political reasons, give all the less, as he is convinced that the, for him, desirable ends may be reached also in another way. Naturally, Chancellor Hitler declared to the German Minister here, this does not indicate any disinterestedness in the idea of Austria's independence. Also, before everything, Germany cannot for the present withdraw Party members in Austria, and must, therefore, in spite of the very real exchange difficulties, make every effort to bring help to the persecuted National Socialist sufferers in Austria. As a result, Minister of Commerce Schacht finally gave the authorization that from then on 200,000 marks a month were to be set aside for this end (support of National Socialists in Austria). The control and the supervision of this monthly sum was to be entrusted to Engineer Reinthaler, who, through the fact that he alone had control over the money, would have a definite influence on the Party followers. In this way it would be possible to end most quickly and most easily the prevailing difficulties and division in the Austrian National Socialist Party.

"The hope was also expressed to Herr von Papen that the recently authorized foundation of German 'Ortsgruppen' of the National Socialist Party in Austria (made up of German citizens in Austria) would be so arranged as not to give the appearance that Germany is planning to interfere in Austrian internal affairs.

"He was also informed that an effort would be made through the easing of the Auslandesperre, particularly with reference to the more westerly Austrian Alps sections, so that to the German-Austrian Alpenverein (Alps Association) a particular role was to be given. The easing of the Auslandesperre was naturally only to be accorded to those who obligated themselves to visit the more westerly Austrian Alps sections and to go to fixed towns and live in specified hotels or inns."

A085800

This policy

H2318 - 0031

1760-PS

This policy of the Nazis was dictated solely by considerations of expediency. The basic aim of achieving Anschluss remained wholly unchanged. The brutal murder of Dollfuss, the Austrian Chancellor, and the unquestioned direct attack on Austrian sovereignty through the Putsch, directed by the German Government from Germany, had so shocked public opinion in Austria and in Europe that the Nazis could not afford for the time being to take open action.

That the policy of Anschluss remained wholly unchanged was confirmed to me by Franz von Papen when he arrived in Vienna as German Minister. It will be recalled that he accepted this assignment as German Minister even though he knew that he had been marked for execution in the St. Barthlomew's massacre on June 30, 1934. When, in accordance with protocol, he paid me a visit shortly after his arrival in Vienna, I determined that during this call there would be no reference to anything of importance and I limited the conversation strictly to platitudes which I was able to do as he was calling on me in my office. I deemed it expedient to delay my return call for s everal weeks in order to make it clear to von Papen that I had no sympathy with and on the other hand was familiar with the objectives of his mission in Austria. When I did call on von Papen in the German Legation, he greeted me with "Now you are in my Legation and I can control the conversation". In the baldest and most cynical manner he then proceeded to tell me that all of Southeastern Europe, to the borders of Turkey, was Germany's natural hinterland, and that he had been

A 035801

charged

H2318 - 0032

1760-PS

charged with the mission of facilitating German economic and political control over all this region for Germany. He blandly and directly said that getting control of Austria was to be the first step. He definitely stated that he was in Austria to undermine and weaken the Austrian Government and from Vienna to work towards the weakening of the Governments in the other states to the South and South East. He said that he intended to use his reputation as a good Catholic to gain influence with certain Austrians, such as Cardinal Innitzer, towards that end. He said that he was telling me this because the German Government was bound on this objective of getting this control of Southeastern Europe and there was nothing which could stop it and that our own policy and that of France and England was not realistic.

The circumstances were such, as I was calling on him in the German Legation, that I had to listen to what he had to say and of course I was prepared to hear what he had to say although I already knew what his instructions were. I was nevertheless shocked to have him speak so baldly to me and when he finished I got up and told him how shocked I was to hear the accredited representative of a supposedly friendly state to Austria admit that he was proposing to engage in activities to undermine and destroy that Government to which he was accredited. He merely smiled and said, of course this conversation was between us and that he would, of course, not be talking to others so clearly about his objectives. I have gone into this detail with regard to this conversation as it is characteristic of the absolute frankness and directness with which high Nazi officials spoke of their objectives.

Nazi

A085802

H2318 - 0033

1760-PS

Nazi activities, forced underground in this period, were by no means neglected. The Party was greatly weakened for a time as a result of the energetic measures taken against the Putsch and as a result of the public indignation. Reorganization work was soon begun. In October 1934 the Austrian Foreign Minister, Berger-Waldenegg, furnished me the following memorandum, which he told me had been supplied to the Austrian Government by a person who participated in themeeting under reference.

"A meeting of the chiefs of the Austrian National Socialist Party was held on the 29th and 30th of September, 1934, at Bad Aibling in Bavaria.

"The meeting occupied itself principally with the reorganization of the Austrian National Socialist Party and particularly with the measures to be taken to this end in the Tirol.

"Measures were decided upon as to the means to be used to create better contact between the party leadership and its members as well as with respect to new propaganda measures.

"One principal point on the agenda had reference to the preparatory measures to be taken for taking over the power in Austria. It was decided to give to all of the Party Headquarters in Austria instructions preparatory to new Terroristic acts. The necessary material, however, is nevertheless until new instructions are issued not to be transported from the German border into Austria, but shall be kept assembled at appropriate places on the German side of the entire Austro-German frontier.

"From a report received by the Party chiefs on the situation in Vienna and upper Styria, it is established that agreements have been concluded with the Communists and with the Socialists with respect to a uniform and common procedure.

"The agents of the Party Direction in Germany have received orders in every Austrian district to prepare lists of all those persons who are known to actively support the present Government and who are prepared closely to cooperate with it.

"When the

H2318-0034

"When the next action against the Government takes place these persons are to be proceeded against just as brutally as against all those other persons, without distinction of party, who are known to be adversaries of National Socialism.

"In a report of the Party leaders for Austria the following principles have been emphasized:

"A. The taking over of the power in Austria remains the principal duty of the Austrian National Socialist Party. Austria has for the German Reich a much greater significance and value than the Saar. The Austrian problem is the problem. All combat methods are consecrated by the end which they are to serve.

"B. We must on every occasion which presents itself appear to be disposed to negotiate, but arm at the same time for the struggle. The new phase of the struggle will be particularly serious and there will be this time two centers of the terror, one along the German frontier and the other along the Yugoslav frontier."

The Austrian Legion was kept in readiness in Germany. Although it was taken back some miles further from the Austrian frontier, it remained undissolved in spite of the engagement which had been taken to dissolve it. The Austrian Government received positive information to this effect from time to time which it passed on to me and I had direct information to the same effect from reliable persons coming from Germany to Vienna who actually saw the Legion.

On the surface, however, German activities consisted principally of efforts to win the support of prominent and influential men through insidious efforts of all kinds, including the use of the German Diplomatic Mission in Vienna and its facilities and personnel. Von Papen as German Minister entertained frequently and on a lavish scale. He approached almost every member of the Austrian Cabinet, telling them, as several of them later informed me, that Germany was bound to prevail in the long run and that they should join the winning side if they wished

A 035804

to enjoy

H2318-0035

1760-PS

positions of power and influence under German control. Of course, openly and outwardly he gave solemn assurance that Germany would respect Austrian independence and that all that she wished to do was to get rid of elements in the Austrian Government like the Chancellor, Schuschnigg and Starhemberg as head of the Heimwehr and others, and replace them by a few "nationally-minded" Austrians, which of course meant Nazis. The whole basic effort of von Papen was to bring about Anschluss.

In early 1935, the Austrian Foreign Minister, Berger-Waldenegg, informed me that in the course of a conversation with von Papen, the latter had remarked "Yes, you have your French and English friends now and you can have your independence a little longer". The Foreign Minister, of course, told me this remark in German but the foregoing is an accurate translation. The Foeign Minister told me that he had replied to von Papen "I am glad to have from your own lips your own opinion which agrees with what your chief has just said in the Saar and which you have taken such pains to deny." Von Papen appeared to be terribly upset when he realized just what he had said and tried to cover his statements, but according to Berger-Waldenegg, kept constantly getting into deeper water.

Von Papen undoubtedly achieved some successes, particularly with men like Glais-Horstenau and others who had long favored the "Grossdeutschtum" idea, but who nevertheless had been greatly distrubed by the fate of the Catholic Church. Without conscience or scruple, von Papen exploited his reputation and that of his wife as ardent and devout Catholics to overcome the fears of these Austrians in this respect.

4085805 Developments

1760-PS

Developments in the fall of 1935 and the spring of 1936 gave Germany an opportunity to take more postive steps in the direction of the Nazification of Austria. Italy, which had given Austria assurance of support of the most definite character against external German aggression, and on one occasion, by mobolizing her forces, had undoubtedly stopped German aggressive action which had been planned against Austria, embarked on her Abyssinian adventure. This and the reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936 completely upset the balance in Europe. The French and the British Minister informed me that as early as August 1935, they had informed their Governments, on the basis of conversations with the Austrian Foreign Minister, that if there was to be any Danubian Pact, it would have to come into being rapidly for the Austrian Government would be forced to negotiate with Germany even though it would have no confidence that any such agreement arrived at would be respected.

The result of all these forces was the Austro-German accord of July 11, 1936, the public text is as follows:

> "Convinced that they are thereby rendering a valuable contribution toward the peaceful development of Europe, and believing that they are thereby doing the best service to the various common interests of the two German States, the Government of the German Reich and the Government of the Austrian Federal State have decided to restore normal and friendly mutual relations.
>
> "It is therefore declared:
>
> "(1) In the sense of the statement made by the Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor on May 21, 1935 the German Government recognizes the full sovereignty of the Federal State of Austria:[1]

1. On May 1935, in a speech in the Reichstag, Hitler had stated with respect to Austria (I quote from Documents on International Affairs,

4085806

H2318 - 0036

H2318 – 0037

"(2) Each of these two Governments shall regard the internal political conditions of the other country, including the question of Austrian National-Socialism, as a domestic concern of that country, upon which it will exert neither direct nor indirect influence:

"(3) The Austrian Federal State Government's general policy and its policy toward Germany in particular shall be constantly guided by the Principle that Austria recognizes herself to be a German State. The Rome Proctocol of 1934, together with its additional clauses of 1936, and the relations of Austria to Italy and Hungary, as partners in the said protocols are not hereby affected.

"Recognizing that the relaxation of tension desired by both parties can be brought about only if in addition certain preliminary conditions are established by the Governments of both countries, the Reich Government and the Austrian Federal Government shall in a series of detailed measures create these required preliminary conditions."

Even more important than the terms of the agreement published in the official communique, was the contemporaneous informal understanding, the most important provisions of which were, that Austria would (1) appoint a number of individuals enjoying the Chancellor's confidence but friendly to Germany to positions in the Cabinet; (2) would devise means to give the "national opposition" a role in the political life of Austria and within the framework of the Patriotic Front, and (3) would amnesty all Nazis save those convicted of the most serious offenses. This amnesty was duty announced by the Austrian Government and thousands of Nazis were released, and the first penetration of the

---

Continuation of Foot Note 1 from page 28.

Vol. I. 1935, published by the Royal Institute of National Affairs, (London, 1936) p. 171):

"Germany neither intends nor wishes to interfere in the internal affairs of Austria, to annex Austria, or to conclude an "Anschluss". The German people and the German Government have, however, the very comprehensible desire, arising out of a simple feeling of solidarity due to a common national descent--namely, that the right to self-determination should be guaranteed, not only for foreign nations but to the German people everywhere. I myself believe that no regime which does not rest on public consent and is not supported by the people can continue permanently."

A0085807

H2318 - 0038

1760-PS

Deutsche Nationaler into the Austrian Government was accomplished by the appointment of Dr. Guido Schmidt as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and of Dr. Edmund Glaise-Horstenau as Minister without portfolio.

The significance of these arrangements can best be explained by quoting from an official despatch which I wrote in October 1934 when concern was being expressed with regard to conversations which Chancellor Schuschnigg was reported as having with the "moderate Nazis", Reinthaller and Riehl. I then reported as follows:

"It is obvious, however, that in view of certain well known facts, these conversations will be followed with interest. A major consideration which will not be disregarded is the fact that Chancellor Hitler himself has always been in favor of indirect rather than direct action in bringing Austria into the German picture. It is his belief that the way to be followed is to get representatives of the National Socialist Party into the penetration. It is an indication of political astuteness, for it is quite certain, in the opinion of many objective observers, that if once a militant, even though small, National Socialist minority gets representation in the Cabinet, it will be the forerunner of absorption. To explain why this is so is rather difficult, as it requires a full appreciation of many factors at play in Germany and in Austria. Briefly, however, it may be epitomized in the terroristic policy which is one of the primary principles of National Socialism. Even before July 25, when the National Socialist Party was legally prohibited, it was very difficult to get proper police and judicial action against National Socialists who committed terroristic acts or who were plotting against the Government. This inaction came, not through sympathy with the movement or through lack of definite knowledge of overt acts, but through fear - through fear of reprisals when a National Socialist regime might come, and that if it did come, those who had proceeded, even though in the line of duty, against National Socialists, would be dealt with with the barbarity and intolerance with which National Socialism has treated its opponents in Germany. The determined attitude of the Government after July 25, strengthened the administration of justice and of the security forces, and this changed attitude came about as a result not only of the feeling within the country that National Socialism would not come now, but also as a result of the action of the powers in support of the independence of Austria.

A-085808

Should

H2318 - 0039

1760-PS

Should the conversations which the Government is having with the National Socialist groups reawaken this fear, or should there be any weakening of the attitude of the Government towards National Socialists be admitted even to indirect or subordinate participation in the Government, it would undoubtedly bring back this fear in an even more acute form and bring into what element of weakness.

"The fact that these conversations are taking place need, therefore, not be considered as being intrinsically a distrubing factor in the internal and external situation of Austria, but should these National Socialist elements in the Government, there is reason for the gravest concern, not only so far as the internal situation in Austria is concerned, but this might become the focal point of disturbance without the country..."

The sequel of the agreement was the only one which could have been expected in view of all the facts and previous recorded happenings. Active Nazi operations in Austria were resumed under the leadership of a certain Captain Leopold, who it was known definitely was in frequent touch with Hitler. The Nazi program was now to form an organization through which the Nazi could carry on their operations openly and with legal sanction in Austria. There were formed in Austria several organizations which had a legal basis but which were simply a device by which the Nazis in Austria could organize, and later seek inclusion as a unit in the Patriotic Front. The most important of these was the Ostmarkischer Verein, the sponsor of which was the Minister of the Interior Glaise-Horstenau. Through the influence of Glaise-Horstenau and the pro-Nazi Neustadter-Sturmer, this organization was declared legal by the Courts.

1960-PS

1960-PS

the courts. I made specific mention of the foregoing because it shows the degree to which the situation in Austria had disintegrated as a result of the underground and open Nazi activities directed from Germany.

Even more open recognition of the Nazis was demanded. In January 1937, Captain Leopold submitted a memorandum of Nazi demands, which, though not formally received, were known to and considered by the Austrian Cabinet. The Leopold memorandum is as follows:

For the Internal Pacification of Austria.

"The common declaration of the Austrian Federal Government and the German Reich Government of July 11, 1936, was a state-act of far-reaching significance. We are convinced that in days to come history will praise the statesmanlike wisdom of an agreement concluded in time. This being a step of high diplomacy, the public would not be and was not informed of it previously. We Austrian National Socialists were at first surprised at the conclusion (of the agreement) and its contents. In full discipline we awaited the clarification of the internal political effect of the agreement, which was quite generally expected by the public pursuant to the announcement of the amnesty. Only when it appeared from public speeches of leading personages which were addressed to groups for whom an expectant disciplined attitude was more difficult than for us, that in internal political respects-with the exception of the issuance of an amnesty-no change in the fight was to be expected, did we decide to manifest our will, viz, if necessary to continue the fight. We wished to prove above all that we could conduct the struggle singlehanded, that we had conducted it for a long time without foreign influence and help, and that we were proud of this fact. There was no lack of suspicions which arose amongst the public or attempts to humiliate us in the anti-German press. After the first surprise an attack from all sides started. Under the leadership of the Czech and

Swiss Jewish

A 035810

H2318 - 0040

H2318 - 0041

1760-PS

Swiss Jewish press the legend of the "Trojan Horse" was invented, which was to cast suspicion and doubt upon the intention of the declaration of July 11 and was calculated to create a reaction among the partisans of the Austrian Government.

Now some time has passed, and both sides can see clearly. By the agreement of July 11 the German Reich recognized the full soverignty of Austria and repeated the declaration of the Leader and Chancellor that the German Reich will never forcibly annex Austria. The "Anschluss" of Austria to Germany, therefore, will never be sought by the latter, and it is exclusively a matter for the Austrian Federal State to decide on this question as well as on the form of its government and constitution. It was likewise declared that the question of the Austrian National Socialists was withdrawn from any influence of the German Reich. As the same applies to the entire internal political structure the pacification or the continuation of the struggle is an internal political matter regarding which the Federal Government must decide. Thus there can exist no doubt but that both parties have the possibility to iron the struggle out formally which was conducted for such a long time with heavy sacrifices. In favor of this possibility is the fact that the first consequence of this struggle, the effect on foreign policy and hence the permanent danger of conflict and damage to entire German interests, is eliminated forever.

If we declare ourselves ready for a pacification, this is done in view of the following considerations:

1) The state of affairs that a large, useful and enthusiastic section of the population persists in a political conviction which is opposed most rigorously by the state leaders as purely inimical to the state cannot, since after three years of self-sacrificing fight no change has been brought about, be maintained in the long run without people and state suffering serious damage. Even now it will not be easy to build a bridge over the abyss, and much discipline, readiness for sacrifice and renunciation will be necessary on both sides.

2) A further section of the people stands in the Marxist camp. The Government Front has not been able to attract this section or has attracted it only for the sake of appearance. It is at present entirely under the influence of Communism. The dangerous character of this condition has become so manifest during the past few weeks and days that it is useless to discuss it.

3) It is

1760-PS

3) It is indispensable to win over this scarcely disguised section of the people which, as before, is still Marxist. A state which has to fulfill such large and difficult tasks cannot be ruled in the long run even against a strong minority. The positive elements of the Government Front did not succeed in winning the workmen. The true liberation from Marxist delusions is only possible for a movement based on new revolutionary ideas. National Socialism in the Reich has proved that formerly Marxist workmen, in a spiritual and political struggle of the largest dimensions, can be freed from the spell of Marxism hostile to state, society and religion and again made the most faithful members of people and state. Here, too, the most favorable time has passed. Better later than too late.

4) All these necessities become still more urgent in view of the uncertainty of the situation in Europe. Internal disintegration is bound to prevent or render difficult the large-scale militarization categorically demanded at present. The danger of a Communist revolt on the part of the illegal red organizations may also be judged differently despite all zeal and armament even with the most heavy arms. The outbreak of the red revolt in case of war is certain; it is even probable in case of a further European entanglement, even though our country may not be involved in it, or in case of Communist entanglements in France and the Balkans.

5) The entire people (even with the contrary ideas of the section addicted to Marxism) desires a complete renewal of the life of the people and the state, although with different goals. There exist conscious and unconscious common interests. First the direction must be determined and the unification of the people carried through; then only is the great renewal possible.

6) If internal pacification is necessary, perhaps not time is to be lost for many reasons, and it must be carried out as quickly as possible. On the other hand, the psychological time is favorable. After the removal of the fears on both sides it can be said:

The Government has a free hand. If it decides for pacification, it and its partisans have the certainty that they will not be suspected of acting under coercion or outward pressure. The term elapsed since the

agreement

A 085812

H2318 - 0042

H2318 - 0043

1760-PS

agreement refutes such a suspicion.

The same applies as well to the Austrian National Socialists. For us the solemn declaration that Austria in its foreign policy declares itself a German state and establishes its relations with the German Reich accordingly means relief from serious concern. If, moreover, it is realized that every section (of thought) had the best intention for our people and our country, an intention based on its own world viewpoint, if it is realized that not only the other section made a mistake, then it should be possible to find a bridge.

7) Of course, there exist no compromises for world points of view which confront each other sharply. We do not wish to investigate here how far this is the case in Austria. As regards the view which denies incompatibility, reference may be made to Bishop Hudal. But between contrary world viewpoints a modus vivendi is possible as well. Should Austria, because the struggle here was most acute, perhaps be destined to provide the solution? That solution might read as follows: Declaration in favor of common racial stock as sole purpose of the political life of the state. Adherence to Christianity as basis for morality. However, it may read, a modus vivendi can be found with some good will.

8) Fully aware of the responsibility existing for both parties, and to avail ourselves for a possibility of conciliation perhaps existing once only in history, we must issue a warning against half or long drawn out solutions carried through in stages. The work of unification, and the renewal of the life of the people and state with all the great tasks connected therewith, cannot be carried through without a great enthusiasm, without a great impulse, and without joy over the final termination of a serious struggle. The real termination of the Austrian revolution Chancellor Schuschnigg called Austrian events since 1933. The creation of a better and durable new system requires a spiritual renewal of public life, which only honest enthusiasm and faithful confidence in the method to be adopted can bring.

It will be necessary in order not weaken the general impulse which will be caused by the general joy over the conclusion of peace, to come before the public with a finished plan which is not to be discussed any further. Partial solutions would damage the valuable psychological result.

A085813

It will

It will likewise be necessary to impress on the minds of the people by a solemn act of state and in a propagandist manner the significance of the pacification. In this way it might be possible to carry away doubters, dissatisfied and irreconcilable people in both camps by a storm of enthusiasm which should not be checked, but rather kindled, and force large sections of former Social Democrats which have not entirely fallen under the influence of Communism to pay attention. A successful work of reconstruction will then bring success to the longed for political unity of the entire people.

9) Thus a solution is necessary which makes it also possible for us as the actual supports of the political formation of will of large and valuable sections of the people, to consent to it honestly and joyously. This consent can be based only on a free decision which is not made under constraint. It is, therefore, necessary on the occasion of the commencement of serious negotiations that the heavy burden of serious persecution which is weighing on us, of imprisonment of our fellow-combatants, of great reproach and of state hostility be removed. Only after the granting of moral fundamental equality of rights and after the cessation of intolerable discrimination is a free and honest understanding possible for which we can gladly make ourselves answerable with all our force.

10) The recognition of moral equality of rights, the termination of debasement to citizens of the second class cannot take place by a word, however honestly it may be meant, but only by a deed.

11) We consider the following indispensable:

Issuance of legislation for pacification and administrative measures pertaining thereto.

Measures for the internal political pacification of Austria.

I. Full amnesty.

1) Amnesty. a) Legal promulgation of a general full (not condition) amnesty, generally valid for all political punishable offenses which were committed by National Socialists or Nationals before the date of promulgation.

b) Promulgation and complete execution of the administrative amnesty.

c) Amnesty

A 085814

H2318 - 0044

c) Amnesty as well for prisoners still imprisoned on the charge of base crimes, if the punishable offenses were committed for clearly political motives.

d) Cancellation of all fines, of judgments of restitution, and of charges for imprisonment and proceedings in court.

e) Amnesty for pupils and students, cancellation of the political clause on testimonials, inclusion of all terms spent abroad during expulsions from the university.

2) Amnesty in a broader sense:

a) General legal cancellation of all measures (including disciplinary decisions) through which federal employees, including army, provincial and municipal employees, suffered damage because of National Socialist or National activity or sympathy.

b) Particularly general cancellation or waiving of the legal consequences of sentences such as, cancellation of academic degrees, premature pensioning, dismissal, suspension of salary or pension, reduction of salaries, withdrawal of the right to exercise a profession, etc.

c) Repayment of fines paid, damages paid, charges paid for imprisonment and proceedings, restitution of confiscated objects in cases of urgent need, particularly if the persons concerned sustained a serious loss for their future existence.

d) Cancellation of all deprivation of citizenship for reasons of nationalistic activities or because of emigration.

II. Restoration of equal citizenship rights.

By a legal act the principle must be explicitly recognized that National Socialist conviction and activity have neither a character hostile to the State nor in the meaning of the above stipulations a character hostile to the Government. National Socialist conviction, membership in the National Socialist Party and National Socialist activity may not cause a lessening of citizenship rights or lead to discrimination. Hence absolutely equal treatment in cases of:

a) Appointment

A 085815

H2318 – 0045

1760-PS

1760-PS

a) Appointment to state and corporative bodies, posts and functions.

b) Entry into the army, militia, executive, labor services, etc.

c) License and right to fulfill a profession of any kind.

III. Authorisation to carry through a large-scale work of relief for all victimes of political quarrels and of the crisis; authorization for autonomous organizations to this end.

IV. Restoration of normal legal conditions.

1) Pursuant to the recognition of the principle that National Socialist conviction and activity have no character hostile to the State or Government, general cancellation of all contrary stipulations, hence:

2) Orders to all departments of justice to make no charges on the count of National Socialist activity according to the political articles in the penal code, particularly par. 58-65 and 300 of the Penal Code, as well as the state protection law.

3) Reestablishment of the independence of judges, cancellation of all disciplinary decisions, decisions regarding transfer and all other administrative measures against judges.

4) Reestablishment of normal conditions in administrative penal proceedings.

a) National or National Socialist conviction is not to be punished.

b) No punishments are to be inflicted if only suspicion exists.

c) Restriction of the maximum limit in administrative penal proceedings on the charge of activity for the National Socialist Party.

d) cancellation

A 085816

H2318 – 0046

1760-PS

1760-PS

d) Cancellation of the cumulative principle. In case of several administrative transgressions, punishment is to be inflicted for all concurrent transgressions, observing the general maximum for punishment.

e) Removal of all restrictions of legal proceedings. Appeal must be possible.

f) Removal of double jurisdiction because of National Socialist activity. (No duplication of court administrative punishments).

g) Appeal to the Federal Court to be made possible. New appointment of judges to this court with a view to removing the one-sided composition.

h) No arrests because of National Socialist activity or conviction.

5) Reestablisment of conditions regarding the rights of personnel as they existed before March 1933, particularly:

a) The legal consequence of the loss of office after administrative punishment will be invalidated.

b) Dismissal from a post without disciplinary proceedings is no longer to take place.

c) In disciplinary proceedings as well, the principle that National Socialist activity is not to be considered hostile to the state or the Government or as otherwise objectionable is to be enforced.

V. Freedom for cultural and national-political activity.

1) Reestablishment of those conditions which existed before 1933.

a) The German School Association Südmark, the Gymnastic Association 1919, the Austro-German Alpine Association, the German Singing Association, and all other national cultural organizations will again receive their full freedom. The prohibitions and restrictions ordered with regard to a few branches will be removed.

b) All these

A 085817

H2318 - 0047

b) All these organization will be allowed to reusme their personal amd material relations with similar organizations of Germans and of Germans living abroad.

c) The Austrian press, the radio and institutions of national education will not be hindered in their objective reporting on events, institutions and achievements of the German Reich.

d) All restrictions regarding the import of books and periodicals from Germany and from Germans living abroad will be waived, unless these books refer to the past period of struggle.

e) The exchange of radio programs will be increased.

f) Adherence to the entire Germanism and promotion of the German character of Austria by cultural performances in this sense will be no longer prevented.

g) Full freedom of work for everyone devoting himself to the cultural and national unity and development of the two German states will be ensured.

VI. Measures for political equality of rights.

1) A final line must be drawn under the past period of struggle, cessation to discussions thereon, termination of political discrimination.

2) Rebuilding of the national press, foundation of a large daily paper in several issues, of a small paper, a weekly, and illustrated paper and of monthly periodicals, permission again for the provincial press, removal of press-censorship, removal of all difficulties and chicaneries.

3) Permission for propaganda among different organizations, particularly among the Marxist workmen.

4) Relinquishing the large social-political and military-political work of training a large and for the present voluntary "Arbeitsdienst", which is to be organized.

5) Establishment

4085818

H2318 - 0048

1760-PS

5) Establishment of a national youth organization within the frame of existing organizations.

6) Elimination from official political office of irreconcilable elements and saboteurs of the policy of July 11 and of internal pacification.

7) Of course when these measures are started, the national opposition and particularly the illegal National Socialist Party, prohibited as well in the future, will change (its attitude). It will, however, support not only the proposed measures, but any other reconstructive activity of the Government as well, and will reserve to itself merely the right of objective, positive criticism and only unearth the oppositional work of subordinate quarters. The full discipline of the movement will stand for this; it will energetically suppress oppositional work and saboteurs, it will, though without legal recognition, especially stand on the ground of facts and of the Constitution of 1934. It will refrain from any kind of cultural struggle in view of the fact that Austria is a predominantly Catholic state.

8) The objection might be raised that the proposed contribution on the part of the Government is disproportionately large. The Government alone is in possession of all means of power; only it, therefore, is in a position to create justified preliminary conditions. The illegal National Socialist movement can only contribute through the spirit of the movement, tested in the serious struggles of many years, by its faith, its discipline and its confidence in leadership. This, however, in reality is more than mere legal and administrative measures, in the execution of which the actual power remains in the hands of the Government.

After the reestablishment of moral equality of rights, pacification, reconstruction and work of renewal is possible according to the following points of view:

1) An absolute requirement is the orientation of foreign policy, insofar as that has not yet taken place by the agreement of July 11.

Obligations should include an alliance in case the Reich were attacked by more than one great power binding Austria to the closest military cooperation, similar armament, regulation of chief command in case of alliance, and military training of the entire people.

2) Principles

*085819

H2318 - 0049

2) Principles of internal policy: Solemn declaration in favor of common recial stock as the purpose of the political life of the state determined by Providence. Adherence to Christianity as basis of morality. This synthesis is possible, because even the Austrian Constitution solemnly calls Austria a German state, this now being practically comfirmed, while on the other hand the National Socialists adhere in their program to positive Christianity.

3) The execution of the political will of the people is just as indispensable as the expression of this will through a plebiscite. Acceleration of the plebiscite is necessary so that reconstructive work can be begun. Attention must be directed to the question "For or against pacification."

4) The final decision regarding the form of State and Anschluss will be left to a free plebiscite.

5) Up to that time full equality of rights, freedom of propagnada, and the right reserved to hold spiritual discussions. Absolute renunciation, however, of discussions concerning the past period of struggle.

6) Renunciation of any defensive formation. Elimination of political influence in the militia. Development of the Labor Corps from men whom the National Socialist movement trusts, or equality of rights through the establishment of formations of which the nucleus will be formed by the illegal SA and SS.

7) Prohibition of the Jewish press, numerus clausus law regarding editors, suppression of other agitation. Our own National Socialist press.

8) Practical anti-Semitism in principle, at first Numerus Clausus for officials and free professions, as well as universities and intermediate schools.

9) Most rigorous fight against Communism of all kinds, unmasking of the hidden cells.

10) Large-scale reconstruction policy according to the example of the German Reich and Italy.

11) If these programmatic principles are solemnly laid down publicly, announced in a suitable form and objectively adhered to, the question of state politics and organization is a question of second order. It might be

#085820

H2318 - 0050

1760-PS

might be possible for the program to be carried through even though National Socialists do not themselves participate in the power and remain prohibited. A permanent and real solution, however, can only consist in the establisment of a political organization to be built up autonomously, with full freedom of action and full right of progaganda. This can be developed within the scope of a common front. The reform of political life, however, must be symbolised by a new name for an extensive collective organization to take the place of the Patriotic Front, for instance "Deutsche Ostmarkfront" or "Oesterreichische Front". This is necessary because only a political organization internally and externally new will have the capacity to concentrate and honestly convince the entire people, a condition preliminary for the success of really large-scale reconstruction.

12) After having achieved these preliminary conditions, full co-responsibility and cooperation is possible through cabinet changes. The appointment of men in whom both sides have confidence must be made for the posts of Vice Chancellor, Minister of the Interior, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Secretary of State Dr. Schmidt to be appointed Ministerfor Foreign Affairs) Minister of Justice, Minister of Commerce, and Minister of Social Welfare and Health.

13) The Proposals made are the minimum demands. If they are fulfilled one may hopefor the successful accomplisment of the pacification, reconstruction and assured future of our home state Austria. If this is made possible by pacifiaction, there exists the determined and enthusiastic will of the movement and its partisans to work for that end.

Later, a petition circulated by Leopold was submitted to the Austrian Government, demanding authorization to form a "nationalistic party", which was to be incorporated as a group in the Political Front. It was a Party which its sponsorship plainly marked as openly Nazi. Pressure for the acceptance of these demads was exercised by staging frequent demonstrations and circulating propaganda, all

of which

#085821

H2318 -0051

of which was financed in and from Germany. Even as soon after July 11 as July 29, 1936, when the Olympic Torch was carried through the streets of Vienna, there were violent Nazi disorders. From then on, and until Austrian sovereignty was destroyed, there were constant arrests and trials of persons accused of distributing illegal literature or staging illegal demonstrations, accompanied by numerous press comments of more or less violence.

The Austrian Government sought to counteract this pressure in some way by allowing activity in favor of a restoration of the Hapsburgs. On his visit to Vienna in Late February 1937, von Neurath took occasion to register Germany's emphatic opposition to any such move. I remember von Neurath's visit very clearly. I had known him well and was on friendly terms with him while I was stationed in Berlin. At that time and after the Nazi came into power, he had told both Ambassador Dodd and me that he had remained as Foreign Minister when the Nazi came into power, in order that he might exercise "a restraining influence" and rendering service to his country. This may have been the initial motive of von Neurath but he rapidly became one of the most complete and in some ways effective instruments of the Nazis. If he was not in accord with what they did, he was a perfect instrument in helping to carry it through.

Although I had

A085822

H2318 - 0052

Although I had known him well in Berlin and had on occasions been in his house in small gatherings, when he came to Vienna in 1937, there were a number of ceremonies and receptions given by the Austrian Government to which the Diplomatic Corps was invited. When he met me at these meetings he treated me with great coolness and even disdain, knowing my complete lack of sympathy with the program to which he had committed himself, and this manner of treating me with disdain and open disregard was probably his way of protecting himself and his own feelings of shame. Shortly after the visit of von Neurath, Chancellor Schuschnigg in my conversations with him told me that in his conversations with von Neurath, during the visit, von Neurath had been just as bad as if Habicht or Frauenfeld had been talking when they had discussed the German demands for the inclusion of Nazis in the Austrian Cabinet.

About the same time, Schuschnigg made some concessions to ease the pressure from the Nazis. In February, he appointed a so-called "Committee of Seven", consisting among others of Dr. Jury and a man named Tavs, to discuss "nationalistic ambitions" with him. In June, following the visit of Glaise-Horstenau and General Kraus and Leopold to Hitler in Berlin, and the increased Nazi activities following, Schuschnigg appointed Seyss-Inquart and Dr. Pembauer to devise a means whereby the "Nationalists" could be incorporated into the Patriotic Front.

Dr. Seyss-Inquart

*085823

H2318 - 0053

Dr. Seyss-Inquart himself was a prominent Vienna Lawyer, who had long been an intimate personal friend of Chancellor Schuschnigg. The Chancellor himself told me on various occasions that Dr. Seyss-Inquart had frequently attempted to convince him that the admission of the Nazis into the Austrian Cabinet would be for the best interest of Austria, in that it would relieve the pressure on Austria by Germany, and that he (Seyss-Inquart) at all times professed a sincere desire to maintain the independence of Austria. I had little personal contact with Seyss-Inquart but I knew from various sources absolutely reliable that while Seyss-Inquart was making these protestations to the Chancellor with whom he had had this intimate friendship, and which the Chancellor repaid by his confidence, Seyss-Inquart was in fact completely insincere. He was known at the time, and I had knowledge of this, to be in frequent contact with many high officials of the German Government and that he had had contact with Hitler himself. My information on this point was obtained not only from sources in Austria but also from acquaintances in Germany. There is only one thing which can be said in favor of Seyss-Inquart at the time and that is that he perhaps did believe the German protestations made to him that Austria's independence would be respected. It is difficult, however, to conceive that a man who was known to have the legal ability

and

H2318 - 0054

and intelligence of Seyss-Inquart could have been completely taken in by these protestations. The probabilities are that at least from the outset he used his friendship with Chancellor Schuschnigg in order to help to destroy the independence of his country in order to make a place for himself.

I left Vienna on, July 11, 1937, in order to assume the post of Assistant Secretary of State in Washington. I, therefore, left Vienna before the final tragedy occurred. The final outcome, however, was then already foreseeable. From the tenor of the Italian Minister's conversations with me it was clear that Italy would not or could not any longer defend Austria militarily against German aggression. It was also clear that Austria could not resist the German pressures alone. Although France had given very definite assurances as to her interest in maintaining Austria's independence and England had expressed her interest therein, the Austrian Government was less and less able to be assured of real support. When the Austrian government could no longer expect the full military support of Italy, it knew that its fate was sealed. Hitler was, therefore, free to work his will in Austria. The only question remaining was when he would do it and when he considered it opportune. The work of disintegration, set forth in this statement, had had its effect. Early in 1938, apparently satisfied that England and France would not move and knowing that Italy could not and would not oppose him, Hitler struck the final

blow

A085825

H2318 - 0055

1760 PS

blow at Austria's independence, bringing to a climax what must be recorded in history as one of the most insidious, dastardly, unjustified and altogether effective series of measures to undermine and bring about the end of a sovereign state, during the course of which machinations and operations the Nazi Government nevertheless consistently openly proclaimed its friendliness towards Austria and its intention of maintaining its respect for its sovereignty and independence.

G. B. Messinger

Subscribed and sworn to before me, William L. Brewster, a Vice Consul of the United States of America, duly commissioned and qualified, in Mexico, D.F., Mexico, this 28th day of August, 1945.

William L. Brewster

William L. Brewster
Vice Consul of the United States of America

Service No. 6687
Tariff No. 38
No fee prescribed.

A 085826

H2318 -0056

1760-P5

1760-P5

H-2318

Filed Nov. 28, 1945
[illegible]
[illegible]

EXHIBIT U.S.A. 57 (1760-PS)

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIALS · NÜRNBERG ·

EXHIBIT U.S.A.

57

(1760-PS)

A 085777

H2318 - 0058

H2318-0059

48. Pages